The headline on HN is different: "Obsidian plugin was abused to deploy a remote access trojan". It's not a plugin that was abused, but the ability for shared vaults to contain plugins.
No. The attack does not depend on the presence of a specific plugin. The ones listed in the article are just the ones that were used in the POC. Any plugin could be modified by the attacker if the user trusts the attacker and accepts 1. the vault, 2. the shared plugins, 3. disables restricted mode.
Thanks! I also scanned the detailed article looking for which plugins were affected and wasn't able to find it. Came to the comments looking for a quicker answer.
One of the reasons why these kind of software is not allowed is that it opens up a new class of social engineering attacks (install this, run this code) against users that have normally placed great trust in their software.
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