TW gets most of energy and calories from strait shipping. It would be PRC mining/denying TW for lulz if anything. Ultimately TW going to have to look to see if they want to be HKers, who got less retarded after kissing PRC boot (see HK kids going to SZ to party) or whether TW wants to be Gaza who capitulates to Israeli demand, because reality is with sufficient force asymmetry, one can destroy civic life enough to force capitulation. And PRC can do that to TW, trivially, with mainland fires alone. The only hold back is the "family across the strait" narrative.
TW forceful reunification even if depopulated husk basically done deal, the real question is whether PRC wants to do an Iran and push US security out of east Asia, which is ultimate grand strategic goal. And to be blunt TW is perfect casus belli to spark this. PRC would be net worse off long run getting TW peacefully and but still deal with US security in region. Hence whether Iran can squeeze US out of CENTOM (even marginally) will set huge precedence.
The down votes to this suggest that many in the west are in denial. China doesn’t need to fight a hot war with Taiwan, they can incrementally pressure Taiwan while their western allies issue impotent statements.
China also doesn't need to annex Taiwan. Chinese people have been brainswashed by the PCC into thinking that it was a life-or-death issue for the country. It is not, and China could live another millenia without controlling the island.
If anything, Taiwan proves that Chinese people can be perfectly fine and rich without the authoritarian grip of the PCC. That's the most likely reason why the PCC clique wants to invade TW.
It's not an existential issue for China. It's an existential issue for the CPP, because Xi made it so. He made reunification with Taiwan by... 2049 (IIRC, but I admit I'm fuzzy on the exact date) a test of the legitimacy of the CCP. So it's an existential issue for the CCP because Xi ran his mouth, basically.
The downvotes suggest that many in the West see it as unconscionable to call people “retarded” for preferring not to be invaded. If someone made a comment like this in my house, I would kick them out immediately and might well never speak to them again.
Isn't a big draw for reunification the advanced manufacturing in Taiwan?
Forced reunification would risk destroying that, either as incidental damage through military operations, or as sabotage.
Far better would be to sit back and allow the US to continue proving itself incompetent and unreliable, until being subsumed like Hong Kong doesn't seem like such a bad deal.
Leading edge semi that's already largely denied to PRC via export controls that overwhelmingly underpins US semi advantage and economy. Glassing TSMC would actually only close advanced semi gap between US and PRC by simply taking most of US semi high end pipeline offline. Meanwhile PRC retains the most complete semi supply chain, they don't have leading edge but they do have almost fully indigenized semi vs decentralized western semi, a lot of which are in PRC missile range.
> doesn't seem like such a bad deal
This fundamentally doesn't address that US would still retain security architecture in region, i.e. TW doesn't host much US hardware anyway - taking tw does not meaningfully shift security balance. The only way to ensure relative geopolitical sanctuary is to boot US forward basing out of East Asia, and to be blunt that is not something done peacefully from PRC side, i.e. unless US voluntarily abdicate from theatre and I don't see that happening. Now maybe PRC can establish overwhelmingly advantageous regional force balance that it's obvious to all US posture no longer security dilemma for PRC, but I wouldn't discount PRC simply wanting to remove US forces from regional equation just to be sure.
TSMC is building US fabs though (or so they claim) so it's not solely a question of denial.
I guess more generally PRC can play a much longer game than the US, which seems intent on destroying its standing with the rest of the world by electing absolute buffoons every 4 years. How many years of this can allies tolerate?
Shutting down the strait of Hormuz for example is extremely damaging to US allies in Asia and we can expect more incompetence over time.
IMO Ability to break US forward base sancturary breaks entire US expeditionary model. US+co land basing responsible for most of strike sortie generation/sustainment. Carriers are mathematically supplementary in theatre level conflicts.
Degrade land based strike sorties and support sorties and push CVG back to ~1000km (where strike stories drop to ~50% due to tanking) = entire strike sortie sustainment math breaks hard. Less strike sorties -> even more dependence on high-end munitions. Combined with resilient antiair also denied US ability to move to budget (i.e. JDAM) mop up phase. Strategically Iran being able to soak US damage and still fire back = US air campaign tactically failed to degrade Iran missile complex chokehold over region. Consider US used up ~half of highend standoff and interceptors (if you believe CSIS) then status quo after crippling forward bases simply broke US war logistics. US cannot sustain (not even matter of afford) to fight Iran with current highend munition burnrate + cvg sortie generation, and and defeat Iran tactically to rely on lowend munitions without more political exposure, i.e. a few more pilot rescues going to start meaningfully chip away at US CSAR fleet. Nevermind political fallout of failed rescue or F35 down in Iranian soil.
Hence Trump pivoted to threatened civil infra / counter-value, US saw limits / diminishing returns on ability to neutralize remaining Iranian counter-force threats. US simply cannot afford to prosecute prolonged counter-force standoff air campaig without further strategic exhaustion. Same reason Iran shifted to counter-value oil/infra because the damage to US basing already done, and their ability to degrade US CSG sorties limited.
thanks for your insights. do you have a background in defense?
much of what you are saying sounds plausible to me, but i really don't know much about modern military tactics. do you have any suggestions for where i can learn more about that topic wrt how it applies to this war?
> Obviously this applies to WestPac
do you mean a a potential war with China? i dont think China has leverage over a critical choke point like Hormuz and is instead exposed to one (Malacca) that US would surely blockade.
Wall of text warning. No background in defense, imo slightly more informed/less stupid enthusiast. There isn't specific reading, most narratives are politically motivated and not worthwhile outside of relevant statistics to inform analysis. Really need to understand subject matter from first principles and run available numbers (that pass smell test). Even declassified will get you a long way, i.e. carrier strike sortie generation at various distances, forward basing sortie generation, munition / interceptor stockpiles, weaponeering (munition expenditure) all relatively known. Useful to also correlate with reporting and compare to past conflicts.
Iran as example: Iran is ~5x larger than Iraq by most metrics, US generated ~5x more sorties in Iraq than Iran (with more carriers and regional basing). Factor in hits on Iraq was with 10% precise munitions, Iran has 100%, but Iran doctrine also designed to tank hits by forcing US to expend more munitions etc... rough napkin match suggests mathematically unlikely for US to damage Iran on same scale vs Iraq given Iran's size, US+co sortie #s and air campaign time frame.
Then see initial claims that 100% of Iran regional strike complex destroyed, but Iran obviously still hitting regional targets at XYZ rate (online trackers etc) and you get better sense of picture. News of ~50% of US forward basing hit, enablers like AWACS or radars hit that will further reduce US efficiency, carrier moved from 500km to 1000km standoff, losing airframes flying over Iran, and it's clear Iran maintains ability to fire back, and what they can hit is effectively forcing US to adopt more conservative tactics to stay outside of Iranian fires. Which translates to even less efficiency - less strike sorties (more tanking) and more highend munitions (to reduce risk). Integrate relevant stats as they become available - CSIS report on ~50% of high end stand off, ~50% of high end interceptors expended and numbers suggest US can not mathematically sustain air campaign tempo which has reached marginal effect in terms of suppressing Iranian ability to fire back without unsustainably burning through high end munition stockpiles for much longer before complete strategic insolvency (US cannot fight peer war without these munitions). It all comports to US air campaign cannot defang Iran militarily, even if it might, continuing would be Pyrrhic, then all the talk about blowing up Iranian civilian infra, doing counter blockade to conserve munitions, moving to negotiations suddenly makes sense.
>i dont think China has leverage
In terms of immediate leverage ~90% of highend semi production and/or semi supply chain, reminder many, many, sole source semi suppliers feeding TSMC Arizona / US fabs from east Asia. Arguably bespoke semi supply chain is currently MORE vulnerable, i.e. less redundant than global oil which have many geographic sources.
In terms of blockade, draw a 5000km circle around PRC. That is PRC IRBM / Antiship range covers Malacca, Hormuz, Aden, aka all critical energy SLOCs. PRC have demonstrate coordinated hypersonic antiship missile strike on moving target at sea, with sufficient space ISR to track US shipping in these regions + PRC industrial base = PRC has magnitude greater potential than Iran to degrade US in much broader geographic theaters, and not just land basing but actively deployed navy, i.e. US not capable of blocking Malacca for long because PRC IRBMs can (at least according to demonstrations) take out US ships, their replenishment fleet or the basing that tops up the replenishment fleet... every piece of logistic chain that sustains USN is exquisitely vulnerable to PRC fires. Ditto with USAF tanking/sustainment/logistics.
In terms of REAL PRC leverage, Draw a 8000km circle, this reaches CONUS - 2025 DoD/W China report finally acknowledges PRC has ability conventionally strike west coast. Note earlier disclaimer that important to filter motivations, i.e. these capabilities have existed for years, it was only acknowledged in 2025. Now ask if PRC can make their 10000km+ missiles conventional, then simple geography math will inform that will reach Texas... that's PADD3, i.e. most of US oil strategic production. That's PRC actual leverage to US blockade (legally act of war) - escalating to reciprocal energy disruption on CONUS. US blockade was only viable strategy if damage unilateral/lowcost (i.e. PRC 10-15 years ago / Iran now). Current consequence with respect to PRC is PRC has option to reciprocally degrade CONUS energy extraction/refining at source for mutual disruption. All signs point to PRC skipping US model of CSGs, B21s for rocket based conventional global strike. Hence game theory behind blockade is broken. I surmise will take a few more years before DoD China report acknowledges broader CONUS vulnerability, and once PRC's CONUS level leverage is treated as baseline, a lot of strategic calculations / narratives will have to shift.
It's 2026, PRC has GEOsync ISR (optic+SAR) with persistent coverage of Pacific and beyond. Combined with 500+ other ISR sats, they basically have full coverage in relevant theatres, with hand offs for tracking/queuing/targeting. There's really nowhere for surface combatants to evade/hide anymore vs PRC tier adversary. US doesn't have ASAT capabilities to shootdown beyond LEO. Without ranting too much, highend C4ISR is basically massive enabler/coordination force multiplier, technically it's feasible to synergize highend C4ISR and upgraded COTs low end drones swarms to kill carrier groups, either via mathematically guaranteed saturation salvos or push A2D2 past max carrier standoff range, i.e. no viable sorties without entering no escape zone. Of course tier1 response is still hypersonics (including drones), but theoretically the techstack now exists for low end loitering swarms (well relative to PRC low end) to also do so for much less.
This is just nonsense. An unmanned platform that can stay on station for a significant time and strike at hundreds of miles and have enough payload to deal significant damage and be fast enough to arrive in meaningful time and somehow survive approaching a carrier group (those planes have guns, remember? it's not just SM-6 spam) cannot be cheap because of hard physical constraints like the energy required to stay in the air. There are no such "COTS" platforms, DJI quads don't cut it across multiple dimensions.
Clearly I'm not talking about hobbyist quads. We're talking shaheed tier loitering munitions, which is completely COTS (i.e. moped piston engines and for Iran sanctioned electronics stripped from washing machines). That's what PRC acquired 1M units of except with indigenous PRC supply chain which can also enhance Iran's D- execution, i.e. add resilient barrage EW proof mesh networking (all commoditized by now), more efficient hfe propulsion to extend ~2500km to ~4000km with some planform improvements. Synergize with high end orbital C4ISR = any carrier fleet within 3000km = swarm loitering no escape zone = as in carriers (must) bolt in opposite direction and drone will geometrically catchup. 3000km also basically max carrier sortie / stand off range with tanking, i.e. functionally A2D2 to push carriers to effectively 0 sortie range.
It's more or less simple VLS and CVW magazine math to figure out total carrier group saturation numbers. This also assuming prioritizing carrier survival... i.e. CVWs may not even be geometrically recoverable if carriers has to GTFO.
Napkin math hypothetical, if a stacked carrier group with 3DDGs quad packed antiair and CVWs where most tasking dedicated to shooting down drones... PRC needs to launch ~3000 enhanced shaheed136 tier moped munitions to fully deplete magazine and saturate. Considering PRC procurement likely getting them at fraction price of Iran (i.e. 10-20k, remember Iran has sanction tax), this probably actually cheaper than PRC hypersonic salvos. We're talking sub 100m swarms that effectively defeat carriers or at minimum draw billions in interceptors. VS 100m tier1 hypersonic ashm salvos that can do so in 1/20th time.
The TLDR is knowing where carriers are is theoretically a solved problem, and knowing where carriers are enables conemps/ops vs those who do not, i.e. if Iran can somehow launch 10000 drones, simply having shit C4ISR means they can't use same tactic.
You keep saying "loitering" and then use one way ranges. If "loitering", where does the time on station come from? Are the drones refuelled? Do they land or do they just crash when they run out of fuel? Or is "loitering" just as a buzzword devoid of meaning?
No, prop drones don't "geometrically catchup". Shahed's extreme range achieved by flying really slow, the top speed (which they don't sustain constantly to conserve fuel) is about 185kph, for the maximum flight time of about 13 hours. US carriers officially can sustain 60kph indefinitely, and in practice they can go faster. That means on a straight line a Shahed can only gain 1600km in the absolute best scenario. In reality it's much less, because launching takes time and the average speed is slower.
The capabilities that you're describing are a fantasy.
Loitering just means extended endurance, i.e. piston engine that can stay on station for 20+ hours / enhanced range of ~4500km, but can also function as attritable max range munitions. They're loitering because definitionally they can loiter, especially with datalink for midcourse corrections (again PRC specialty). It's basically value engineered TLAMs (which you know, loiters) on props instead of turbofan, where props trade speed advantage for range, but speed completely negated by massive A2D2 no escape zone because props still significantly faster than any surface fleet.
>geometrically catchup
A carrier at 3000km and GTFO sprint opposite direction at max speed, i.e. 30knots / 60km, will have prop drones closing speed/gap at 120km per hour. AKA intercept time distance around ~24 hours at 4500km. Hence why I said ENHANCED shaheeds, i.e. swap propulsion with 30% more efficient heavy fuel engines, increase aspect ratio and improved shaheed basically makes carriers operating within 3000kms unable to reach ~4500km endurance no escape zone. This within the platforms SWAP potential, technically can also just swap payload for fuel but HFE and planform improvements simply more efficient.
3000km also VASTLY optimistic scenario for carriers and limits of prop planform/SWAP potential, it's functionally carrier at 0 sortie scrap metal range. Realistically carriers max effective standoff is ~2200km, at which point effective sorties down to 20% (rest tanking/support). So no, mathematically, carriers cannot fastandfurious straight line out of this, and definitely not surface fleet escorts. The capabilities I'm describing is pedestrian for PRC. Unless one thinks PRC cannot build a better shaheed than Iran who literally built them in caves with box of scraps.
People do notice, just not enough to shift purchasing habits. I think most people would rather cycle through styles regularly than BIFL and wear the same shit for 5-10 years. Most people want more stuff than nice stuff. Regardless "quality" brands price curve still stupid. Pay a few dollars more in better materials in a Chinese factory and have someone there do Q&A full time. The BOOM difference between a $10 throwaway t-shirt and $100 premium version is like $3. Incidentally plenty of Chinese BIFL brands from manufactures who white labels for highend brands selling house brands for >30% price.
Blame the fashion industry. Every year they come up with something new that is fashionable that year - a style, a color. Year over year it doesn’t have much impact on majority of people but over several years it compounds and your clothes become not trendy or old fashioned. That’s why BIFL doesn’t work for people. They wouldn’t want to pay a significant premium for quality clothing that they can wear for 10 years when it will likely be out of fashion after 5.
The book's thesis is frankly unwarranted Apple glazing. Asian Tigers trained PRC decades before Apple. Muh designed in California and manufactured in China was always Cupertino hands Chinese factory specs and Chinese engineers and workers building it into reality. US manufacturing already in the shits by then, the idea that Apple substantively "elevated" PRC manufacturing is huffing copium. PRC process engineering was always the hardest part of the equation that somehow gets credited to US. PRC manufacturing made Apple, not the other way around.
The reality is PRC already had magnitude more high end manufacturing talent by the time Apple entered PRC already and they're the ones that made Apple scribbles at scale possible. The stories of PRC manufacturers having stupendously fast line turn arounds, making changes in hours should disabuse the notion they needed learning, when they already knew how to execute at scale. Apple's derisked manufacturing in other countries still can't do this, PRC was doing this on day one - see overnight turnaround to retool iPhone line from plastic to glass screen 20 years ago. Apple went to PRC because PRC already had competently trained manufacturing workforce, and only one that can operate at speed + scale. Apple buying a few 1000 CNC machines doesn't tip the balance remotely in Apple's favour - if sector moved towards CNC and tighter tolerances, PRC industry would have simply followed, Apple $$$ is nice, but PRC doesn't need Apple $$$ - capex is not a bottleneck for their system. And Apple would have never push enough goods and make $$$ without PRC.
CAN rail to port to transPac/Asia is cheaper than rail/truck to US post tariff (most commodities now). Also it's ~75% of CAN exports goes to US, and it was only structurally cheaper under pre-Trump trade arrangements, now it's structurally more expensive.
Carney's just pointing out the obvious, structurally building economy around US integration/dependency has backfired and will continue to even after Trump for the simple reason VZ oil now challenges WCS, and (preferential/discounted crude to US) basically accounts for all CAN-US surplus. CAN would be in massive goods and services deficit otherwise - like 80B deficit. Canada was always massive real political economy loser in US-CAN trade, would have more favorite trade ledger with 100% domestic goods/service (i.e. 0 goods/service trade with US) and 100% global energy.
Reality for CAN is export to US is half commodity, half goods. Of the goods, US has strangled/killed CAN tech, aviation and soon auto and general braindrain. The commodity half, we've send them discount energy because we hedged on integration even though we could have structurally build infra to ship finished products to global markets (at higher margins). Like goods that CAN use to be competitive in, US lobbying / behind scenes shenanigans killed a lot commodity diversification efforts. Meanwhile, again, we have massive non energy goods and service deficit vs US. Goods+Service balance still in CAN favour ONLY because of energy pricing, which again US is getting discount on for CAN being retarded with pipleines not developing refined petro for decades. CAN now getting double fucked for acceding to US gas station arrangement, post VZ, that arrangement is expendable and again, VZ oil not going away after Trump.
>he is willing to be flexible on Human Rights if the price is right
Or Canada no longer needs toe line with US propaganda on human rights, that was always predicated on happy vassal privileges. Canada was always (A)moral, as in morals was always subject to highest bidder. US no longer wants to pay for LIOtard morals so no choice but look elsewhere and adopt next most profitable morals.
> CAN rail to port to transPac/Asia is cheaper than rail/truck to US post tariff (most commodities now). Also it's ~75% of CAN exports goes to US, and it was only structurally cheaper under pre-Trump trade arrangements, now it's structurally more expensive.
The Port of Vancouver’s sulphur export capacity is prebooked for several years. Even with the sulphur boom caused by the Hormuz blockage we are unable to ship it out, but we can rail it out (sorta — cars are booked up too). Many such cases.
Shipping logistics are cheaper _when they work_, and we just went through a shipping demand destruction cycle in 2020 _and_ shipping insurance rates are going up because of naval conflict.
> half commodities half goods
Strong agree. We need secondary processing. The decades-long Liberal push for a postindustrial economy has completely failed.
What rail, road or bridge in the US lasts 50 years? The maintenance of rail over 6 years costs more than replacing all the GPUs in a data center, even at their current markup.
Look up deterioration curve and maintenance curve (J shaped) for hard infra. TLDR is asset stays in good condition for 75% of lifetime i.e. decades with light maintenance (flat part of J). By roads I mean highways where most of the expense / work is in building out the base / sub base (i.e. ballasts for rail), that last decades. US is uniquely bad maintained/prevention but even then major assets do not deteriorate on GPU timeline.
X items per 100k then normalize #s for population. Or actual consumptions of atoms, i.e. electricity, metals, resources.
Depends on what you want to measure, real economic activity or spreadsheet value. Nominal good rough indicator, but countries calculate consumption differently, i.e. PRC lowballs imputed rent, doesn't include social transfers in kind (basically gov expenditure that US bundles into private / household spending). Same with EU welfare state math. These numbers aren't derived from same formula (US formula distorts up).
There's also considerations like value vs extraction... i.e. huge % of US consumption is high rent health care and education. PRC generates magnitude more tertiary with fraction of education spending, we don't say they consume less education. Or American spends 40k on tertiary + healthcare vs Europoor spending 10k. US simply overpaying vs others good for nominal but not actual consumption #s. Or US healthcare spend is ~8% higher than OCED average for comparable / worse outcomes. That's ~2T per year right there, for reference entire PRC HSR network is 1T.
Now spreadsheet $$$ is also "real" in the sense it buys stuff / certain advantages / capture market demand, but it can't buy everything... i.e. a PRC industrial base. On paper it should, but in reality having massive $$$ circulating due to overly extractive consumer economy encourages other easy extractive (service) business models. Service dutch disease. So higher nominal = both strategic and detrimental. Hyper optimized for quarterly profits at expense of overall political economy.
How much of it is people lost skill to determine quality. When everyone did some mending, population had baseline ability to discern quality in clothing, and clothing companies less likely to pull shenanigans.
TW forceful reunification even if depopulated husk basically done deal, the real question is whether PRC wants to do an Iran and push US security out of east Asia, which is ultimate grand strategic goal. And to be blunt TW is perfect casus belli to spark this. PRC would be net worse off long run getting TW peacefully and but still deal with US security in region. Hence whether Iran can squeeze US out of CENTOM (even marginally) will set huge precedence.
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